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When Good Streams Go Dry: United States v. Adair and the
Unprincipled Elimination of a Federal Forum for Treaty Reserved
Rights
Ryan Sudbury*
In 1864, the United States and the Klamath Indians entered into a treaty
in which the tribe ceded its interest in over 22 million acres of land to the
United States government, which also reserved 1.9 million acres for the
Klamath Indians to "be held and regarded as an Indian reservation."' By the
terms of the treaty both parties recognized the importance of hunting and
fishing to the tribe; thus, Article I reserved to the tribe "the exclusive right
of taking fish in the streams and lakes (of the Reservation), and gathering
edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits."'2 Ninety years later, when
the 1954 Klamath Termination Act 3 divested the tribe of its reservation, that
statute expressly stated that it did not "abrogate any fishing rights or privi-
leges of the tribe or the members... enjoyed under Federal treaty.",4
The importance of the usufructuary rights to the Klamath tribe is illus-
trated by a 1905 Supreme Court pronouncement, "[t]he right to resort to the
fishing places.. .were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indi-
ans than the atmosphere they breathed. 5 The ideas contained in this state-
ment by Justice Joseph McKenna served to shape the development of tribal
fishing and water rights jurisprudence for years. Unfortunately, by the time
of this pronouncement, damage to the Pacific Northwest salmon runs had
already occurred. The influx of settlers, and the concurrent development of
large-scale salmon processing and canning, drastically reduced the number
of salmon in the streams.6
As a result of the severe decline in the salmon runs, and the importance
of the resource to all the parties involved, a long series of court battles be-
gan throughout the twentieth century in the Pacific Northwest. The linchpin
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passive voice means. The author also thanks Stephanie Renzi for her patient ear and zest for life.
1. Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1985)
("Oregon DFW').
2. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Or. 1979) ("Adair r') aff d United States v.
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9 t' Cir. 1983) ("Adair 11"). Note that the Supreme Court, in Oregon DFW,
and the Adair I and H courts differ as to the size of the reservation. For the purposes of this paper, I will
use the Supreme Court's figures.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1954).
4. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9 h Cir. 1974) ("Kimball r') (holding that the 1954
Klamath Termination Act did not abrogate the hunting and trapping rights of the tribe or its members).
5. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) ("Winans") (ruling that the United States
treaty with the Yakama Nation reserved the right to the tribes to take fish at their usual and accustomed
places).
6. See Michael Blumm & Brett Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in
the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. Col. L. Rev. 407, 434 (1998).
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in the tribes' arguments over their right to take fish came from the Supreme
Court's decision in Winans,7 and a federal district court decision from
Washington in United States v. Washington.8 While these cases acknowl-
edged the tribal right to take fish, such a right would be useless if the devas-
tation of the economically valuable salmon runs could not be halted or re-
versed. Partly based on the holding of Winans, and partly on Winters v.
United States,9 tribes began to assert an implied right to habitat protection
derived from their treaties. In Phase 2 of the United States v. Washington
litigation, the tribes asserted this alleged habitat protection right and the
district court concluded that the treaty fishing right included an implied
right to habitat protection.' 0 However, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit
vacated the opinion as contrary to sound judicial discretion." Because the
en banc court did not reach the merits of right to habitat protection, its ap-
plication in a case with a concrete set of facts remains an open question.
The Adair litigation began in September of 1975, when the United States
filed suit in federal court "seeking a declaration of water rights within the
Williamson River drainage."1 2 Four months after the United States filed for
the determination of water rights in the Williamson River drainage, the state
of Oregon initiated formal proceedings to adjudicate all water rights in the
Klamath Basin, which included the Williamson River drainage. 3 In 1979,
in United States v. Adair, the District Court of Oregon ruled that the treaty
guaranteed to the tribes an implied right to as much water on the reservation
as necessary to protect their hunting and fishing rights, with a priority date
of time immemorial.' 4 The district court also retained jurisdiction over is-
sues relating to construction, effectuation, modification or enforcement of
7. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81 (holding that the treaties were "not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of fight from them,-a reservation of those not granted," and thus there was "an exclusive
right of fishing reserved within certain boundaries.").
8. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (where Judge Boldt
determined that the treaty phrase "the right to take fish.. .in common with all citizens of the Territory,"
meant that treaty fishermen had a right to take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish).
9. 207 U.S. 564 (1908) ("Winters") (holding that tribes have reserved water rights to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation).
10. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (holding that "[t]he
most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken.").
11. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9t' Cir. 1985) (en banc) (ruling that the
"[li]egal rules of general applicability" announced by the district court were not proper because there was
not a concrete set of facts before the court to base the rule on).
12. Adair l1, 723 F.2d at 1398.
13. Id. Later in 1976, both the Klamath tribe and the state of Oregon intervened in the federal suit.
Oregon argued that the federal suit should be dismissed in favor of the state adjudication pursuant to the
rule announced in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) ("Colorado River") (holding that in situations of concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction,
federal courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction where it would promote "wise judicial
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of
litigation.").
14. Adair 1, 478 F. Supp. at 345.
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the standard that may arise.' 5 The state of Oregon appealed, but in 1983, the
Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the decision.' 6 Relying on the Supreme
Court's standards for federal court abstention under the McCarran Amend-
ment, which creates a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immu-
nity,17 as announced in Colorado River,'8 the Ninth Circuit noted that the
lower court's approach would best serve to avoid "the duplication and
waste of judicial effort that.. .the McCarren Amendment [is] designed to
avoid."'19
Sixteen years later, in 1999, the Oregon Water Resources Department be-
latedly announced the standard to use in quantifying the tribes' water right,
stating that the tribes were entitled to the "minimum quantity of water nec-
essary to protect treaty fish and wildlife resources as they existed in
1979."20 In response, both the United States and the Klamath tribes peti-
tioned the district court to exercise its continuing jurisdiction in order to
clarify the legal standard announced in Adair I and H.21 In Adair III, Judge
Panner issued a short, five-page opinion holding that the tribes have a right
to an allocation of water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,22
and this right must include enough water to support a productive habitat for
fish.23 This ruling appeared to create a right to habitat protection for treaty
15. See United States v. Adair, 187 F. Supp.2d 1273, 1274 (D. Or. 2002) ("Adair lIl') vact'd on
other grounds U.S. v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Adair IV'). The Adair I court announced
its retained jurisdiction in its unpublished declaratory judgment, stating that the court retains continuingjurisdiction "for the purpose of enabling the parties... to apply to this court at any time for such orders
and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction and effectuation of this judgment,
for the modification of any of the provisions hereof, and for the enforcement of compliance with this
judgment." Id.
16. Adair 11, 723 F.2d 1394.
17. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
18. 424 U.S. 800 (holding that while federal courts have a duty to exercise the jurisdiction given to
them in most circumstances, the courts should balance this duty against the need to preserve judicial
resources and prevent piecemeal litigation by abstaining from exercising federal jurisdiction where there
is a comprehensive state adjudication of water rights meeting the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment).
19. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1404 (commending the lower court's approach of addressing only the
legal principles arising under federal law in balancing the preference for a federal forum in which to
litigate Indian rights governed by federal law and the McCarren Amendment's express federal policy of
avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water rights where a comprehensive state adjudication is avail-
able.").
20. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 973 (quoting the preliminary standard established by the Oregon Water
Resources Department, which was claims for instream flow to fulfill the purposes of the Klamath
Tribes' treaty rights for hunting and fishing are proper if the record shows that the claimed amount is the
minimum quantity of water necessary to protect treaty fish and wildlife resources as they existed in
1979..." and that "[c]laims for [water to support] gathering rights are improper.")
21. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1274-75.
22. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1410 (stating that "the Government and the Tribe intended to reserve a
quanitity of water flowing through the reservation not only for the purpose of supporting Klamath agri-
culture, but also for the purpose of maintaining the Tribe's treaty right to hunt and fish on reservation
lands.").
23. Adair 111, 187 F.Supp.2d at 1275-76 (reasoning that water rights less than that which would
support a productive habitat "would result in abrogating the Tribes' treaty right to hunt, fish, gather, and
trap on the reservation lands," and only Congress can abrogate these rights).
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fisheries, an issue that has been debated since it was first raised before
Judge Boldt in Phase 1 of United States v. Washington.24 A right to habitat
protection of fish runs derived from Indian treaties could serve as a legal
basis to restore the devastated salmon runs of the Pacific Northwest. 25 How-
ever, despite the Adair I court's express retention of jurisdiction to interpret
and apply the federal quantification standard, the Ninth Circuit, in Adair IV,
vacated the district court's decision on the grounds that the Water Depart-
ment's interpretation of the federal standard was not ripe for judicial re-
26view.
This note examines the legal and policy implications of both the Adair III
and IV decisions. Part I begins with a brief history of the Klamath tribes, its
treatment by the United States, and the importance of fish to the Klamath
people, as well as a brief history of the Klamath Termination Act and the
Klamath Basin Adjudication. Part II explores the factual and legal events,
27
including the Adair I and H decisions and United States v. Oregon, that
provide the context for Judge Panner's decision in Adair III. Part III exam-
ines the decision by Judge Panner in Adair III, focusing on his determina-
tion that the legal standard for quantifying the tribes' water rights includes
an implied right to habitat protection. Part IV of the paper then discusses
the Ninth Circuit decision in Adair IV and concludes that the Ninth Circuit
erred in vacating Judge Panner's decision on a number of grounds. Finally,
this paper maintains that the legal standard for quantifying tribal reserved
water rights announced by Judge Panner should be applied in other cases
concerning tribal hunting and fishing rights that are dependant on reserved
water rights. This is because Judge Panner properly interpreted and applied
the canons of construction to determine that anything less than enough wa-
ter to support a productive fishery would abrogate the treaty fishing rights,
and abrogation is a power only Congress can exercise.
PART I: BACKGROUND
While the tribes viewed the right to take fish as vitally important for
thousands of years, it was not until the twentieth century that they were
forced into the courtroom to protect this central facet of their culture. The
key to the tribes' court battles has been the treaty phrases that guarantee
them the right to take fish, either expressly or implicitly.28 The Supreme
Court has noted that "contemporaneous documents" demonstrate that the
24. 384 F. Supp. 312 (the habitat protection right was separated out and litigated in Phase 2 of that
case).
25. For an enlightening discussion of the right to habitat protection, see generally Blumm & Swift,
supra note 6.
26. Adair IV, 338 F.3d 971.
27. 44 F.3d 758 (9"h Cir. 1994).
28. Article I of the Treaty that created the Klamath Reservation reserved to the Indians "the exclu-
sive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes (of the reservation), and gathering edible roots, seeds,
and berries within its limits." Treaty with the Klamath, 16 Stat. 707 (Oct. 14, 1864).
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United States' treaty negotiators "recognized the vital importance of the
fisheries to the Indians and wanted to protect them from the risk that non-
Indian settlers might seek to monopolize their fisheries., 29 Despite the
tribes' reliance on the treaties, 30 the development of the West frequently led
to broken promises and crowding out of the tribes, both socially and eco-
nomically.31 In order to understand Judge Panner's Adair III decision, it is
important to briefly examine the history of the Klamath tribes, and the ef-
fects of termination.
A. A Brief History of the Klamath Tribes
The Klamaths, the Modocs and the Yahooskin comprise the consolidated
group of tribes commonly referred to as the Klamath tribes.32 These tribes
occupied their ancestral lands, originally amounting to 22 million acres, in
south central Oregon and northern California for fourteen thousand years
before the first white person set foot in the territory.33 The Klamaths believe
that their creator provided them with all the riches they would need in the
land east of the Cascades. For fourteen thousand years, the tribes' beliefs
proved true, as the tribes once harvested tens of thousands of pounds of
fish, sustaining them through the long winters. 34 The now endangered suck-
ers, "called 'c'wam' by the Klamath Tribes, play an integral role in the
Klamath Tribes' customs and traditions." 3 The c'wam, or sucker, fishery
provided the tribes with significant sources of food and income until the
declining population numbers forced the fishery to close in 1986.36 Because
of the effects caused by white settlers over almost two centuries of devel-
opment, tribal members may now catch just one fish, for ceremonial pur-
poses.37
The 1864 Treaty of Council Grove ended the reign of the tribes over their
38once massive land base and changed the tribes forever. In the treaty, the
29. Washington v. Washington Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658, 666, 686
(1979) ("Passenger Fishing Vessel") (stating further that it would be "inconceivable that either party
deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of the
accustomed places to fish").
30. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667-68.
31. See generally Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219, 260-65
(1986).
32. The Klamath Tribes, History, www.klamathtribes.org/history.htmi (accessed December 2,
2003).
33. The Klamath Tribes, The Case for Tribal Lands Restoration, www.klamathtribes.org/tribal-
lands-restoration.htm (accessed December 2, 2003).
34. The Klamath Tribes, Suckers, www.klamathtribes.org/suckers.htm (accessed December 2,
2003).
35. Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (D. Or. 2001) ("Kandra").
36. Id.
37. The Klamath Tribes, Suckers, www.klamathtribes.org/suckers.htm (accessed December 2,
2003).
38. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath
Basin, 30 Ecology L. Q. 279, 296 (2003).
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Klamath tribes ceded the rights to their traditional homeland and reserved
to themselves a 2.2 million acre parcel for the establishment of a reserva-
tion.39 Because of the important role that hunting and fishing played in the
lives of the Klamath, 40 Article I of the Treaty reserved to the tribes the "ex-
clusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes.. .and of gathering edi-
ble roots, seeds and berries within [the reservation]. ' 4! In return, Article 2
of the Treaty required the United States to pay "sums of money" to the
tribes each year in five-year cycles, with the sum reduced each cycle, and
included a one time payment of $35,000.42 The treaty assigned to the Indian
agent the charge of spending the money for the "use and benefit of [the
tribe]... to promote the well-being of the Indians, [and] advance them in
civilization. 43
In the years after the treaty was implemented, the tribes were forced to
endure a variety of trials and tribulations. First, the United States forced the
Modoc tribe to occupy the reservation with the Klamaths, causing a brief
war between the Modocs and the United States. 44 The insurrection's leaders
were caught and hanged, eventually opening the era of white settlement to
the area.45 To compound the problems, a dispute arose between the Klamath
tribes and the United States over the boundaries of the reservation.46 A
boundary commission was eventually formed, and after interviewing a
number of Klamaths with knowledge of the tribes' history, the commission
concluded that the United States erroneously excluded 617,000 acres from
the reservation, thereby reducing the reservation to two-thirds the size
agreed to by the parties to the 1864 Treaty.47 Largely because the court
deemed that the tribes were twice compensated for the error, first in a 1901
agreement with the United States and later in an Indian Claims Commission
39. The Klamath Tribes, The Case for Tribal Lands Restoration, www.klamathtribes.org/tribal-
lands-restoration.htm (accessed December 2, 2003).
40. See Klamath & Modoc Tribes and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians of Klamath Reservation v.
Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634, 636-7 (D. Or. 1956) (describing the variety of animals that the Klamath
tribes hunted, including: grizzly bear, brown bear, deer, elk, antelope, beaver, raccoon, badger; as well
as the vast array of techniques the tribes used).
41. Treaty with the Klamath, 16 Stat. 707. The Ninth Circuit later interpreted the treaty as includ-
ing the right to hunt and fish. See Kimball I, 493 F.2d at 566.
42. Treaty with the Klamath, 16 Stat. 707. The treaty required the United States to make annual
payments of $8,000 for the first five years, $5,000 for the next five years, and $3,000 for the final five
years. Id.
43. Id. (stating further that the money was to be used primarily for "agriculture, and to secure their
moral improvement and education").
44. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 38, at 296.
45. Id.
46. Oregon DFW, 473 U.S. at 756-57.
47. Id.
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48action, the Supreme Court, in 1986, concluded that the tribes no longer
retained their reserved hunting and fishing rights in the excluded lands.49
Despite the destabilization caused by the reservation era, the tribes con-
tinued to prosper. They relied heavily on the abundance of fish for food,
and established successful cattle and timber industries.50 The expansive
trade network that the Klamath tribes established over the course of their
existence allowed the tribes to build a productive freighting enterprise, with
more than 20 teams working to supply the needs of Klamath County in
1889. 5' Over 880,000 acres of ponderosa pine on the reservation allowed
the tribes to establish a successful sawmill, which supplied timber to the
growing Klamath County economy. 52 By 1953, the Klamath tribal enter-
prises allowed the tribes to nearly reach parity with the majority culture, as
tribal incomes were just seven percent lower than comparable white in-
comes.53 The Klamath tribes were also the only tribes in the country able to
pay their Bureau of Indian Affairs administrative costs, thereby represent-ing very little cost to the American taxpayer.54
B. Termination of Federal Recognition of the Klamath Tribes
1. The Klamath Termination Act
Despite the economic success of the tribes,55 and possibly because of
them, Congress terminated the Klamath tribes in the 1954 Klamath Termi-
nation Act,56 which became effective in 1961.57 The purpose of the Termi-
nation Act was to eliminate federal supervision over the tribes, to dispose of
the federal property related to Indian affairs, and to abolish the federal ser-
vices available to the tribes because of their Indian status.58 To carry out
this policy, the tribal roll was closed, leaving the existing tribal members
with the choice of withdrawing from the tribe and receiving a cash pay-
ment, or to remain in the tribe, which would become a non-governmental
48. However, neither of these forms of compensation included the value of lost hunting and fishing
rights. In determining the value of the land, the boundary commission only considered the land as used
for grazing and timber harvesting. Id. at 758.
49. See generally Id. at 755-774. The Indian Claims Commission compensated the tribe the second
time because of the "unconscionably" low amount paid in 1901. Id. The Supreme Court's predicated its
conclusion that the rights were lost on the existence of the compensation and the history, language and
purpose of the 1901 agreement between the tribe and the United States. Id.
50. The Klamath Tribes, History, www.klamathtribes.org/history.html (accessed December 2,
2003).
51. Id.
52. The Klamath Tribes, The Case for Tribal Lands Restoration, www.klamathtribes.org/tribal-
lands-restoration.htm> (accessed December 2, 2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The Klamath Tribes, Did You Know, www.klamathtribes.org/dyk.html (last accessed December
2, 2003).
56. 25 U.S.C § 564.
57. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d. 768, 770 (9"h Cir. 1979) ("Kimball If').
58. Id.
2004]
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
entity.59 The Act provided for appraisal of tribal property, portions of which
the government would sell in order to pay for the cash disbursals to the exit-
ing tribal members. 60 The Act, which resulted in the elimination of much of
the reservation, and the destruction of the tribes' social, economic and cul-
tural way of life, expressly provided that the Act did not abrogate "any fish-
ing rights or privileges.. .enjoyed under Federal treaty.'
Most of the Klamath Tribe opposed the Termination Act, objecting to the
harm it would bring to the Klamath people. 62 The Department of the Inte-
rior and the independent Stanford Research Institute also opposed the ter-
mination of the Klamaths.6 3 However, Congress did not seek a tribal vote,
and imposed Termination despite the opposition. 64 The process eventually
divested the tribes of their remaining ancestral lands, thereby devastating
the tribal economy, based on timber and ranching, activities necessarily tied
to the divested land.65
2. Kimball v. Callahan: Recognizing the Klamath Tribes' Usufructuary
Rights
Fortunately for the Klamath people, not all was lost in the Termination
Act, as the statute expressly left the treaty hunting, fishing and water tights
untouchedf.6 However, the state of Oregon questioned the significance of
the savings provision in the Termination Act, and it was not until 1979,
when the Ninth Circuit issued its second opinion in Kimball,6 7 that the
tribes' treaty hunting and fishing rights were judicially recognized. 68 De-
spite the importance of the Kimball decisions for Klamath usufructuary
rights, the tribes continue to feel the lingering impacts of termination. In
Kimball I, the Ninth Circuit ruled that hunting and fishing rights were no
longer exclusive.69 The same court later concluded that the state of Oregon
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 564m(b). The Act also expressly left unaffected the tribe's water rights. See 25
U.S.C. § 564m(a). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this phrase as including hunting and gathering
rights. See Kimball 1, 493 F.2d at 569-70.
62. The Klamath Tribes, Termination, www.klamathtribes.org/TerminationStatement.html (ac-
cessed December 2, 2003). Only a minority of Klamaths supported the Termination Act, and were led
by a member that was close to Senator Watkins, the Act's sponsor. All of the Tribes' elected officials
opposed the Act and many made the trip to Congress to testify in opposition. id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a) & (b). See also Kimball 11, 590 F.2d. at 777; Adair I1, 723 F.2d at
1412.
67. Kimball I1, 590 F.2d 768.
68. Id. at 777-78.
69. Kimball 1, 493 F.2d at 569-70. Article I of the Treaty of 1864 originally secured to the tribes
the "exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes.. .and of gathering roots, seeds and berries
within [the reservation]." Treaty with the Klamath, 16 Stat. 707. The Ninth Circuit later interpreted the
treaty as including the right to hunt and fish. See Kimball 1, 493 F.2d at 566.
[Vol. 25
UNITED STATES v. ADAIR
could regulate the treaty hunting and fishing rights in the name of conserva-
tion.70
Despite the fact that Congress restored the Klamath Tribes in 1986, 7" the
tribal income, once almost on par with the majority society, is now among
the lowest in the state.72 On top of their depressed incomes, the Klamath
people continue to suffer from the spiritual and cultural loss of their home-
land, not to mention the loss of a significant economic base, as Congress
failed to restore their former reservation lands, which currently make up
much of the Winema National Forest.73 In light of this inequitable history,
the fight that the Klamath tribes have sustained for its federally guaranteed
water rights is unsurprising. Concomitantly, the maltreatment that the tribes
have suffered at the hands of the dominant society's government should put
a thumb on the balance in favor of the tribes when federal courts consider
legal issues surrounding the Klamath water rights, especially when the op-
ponent to the rights represents another branch of the dominant society's
government, in this case, the state of Oregon.
PART II: PRELUDE TO THE ADAIR III DECISION
A. Reserved Water Rights and the Winters Doctrine
Reserved water rights began with the Winters decision, the second major
reserved rights case to come from the Supreme Court.74 The issue in the
case was whether the 1888 treaty creating the Fort Belknap reservation of
Montana contained a reservation of water rights for the tribes inhabiting the
reservation. The court determined that when the United States created the
reservation, it sought to change the habits of "a nomadic and uncivilized
people," to those of "a pastoral and civilized people. 75 Justice McKenna,
writing for the court, held that it would not make sense to construe a treaty
with the purpose of creating an agrarian people, as not containing water
rights necessary to make the ard land useful and valuable. 76 This was espe-
cially true with most Indian tribes considering that prior to the treaty "the
Indians had command of all the lands and waters," and that the canons of
70. See Kimball II, 590 F.2d at 778.
71. See Klamath Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 566.
72. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 38, at 297.
73. Adair 1, 478 F.Supp. at 340.
74. The first reserved rights case was United States v. Winans, where the Supreme Court concluded
that treaty reserved rights were "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them,-a
reservation of those not granted." The court held that the reserved fishing rights of the Yakama at their
"usual and accustomed places," created an implied right of access to the fishing places. Two important
developments resulted from this holding, first the Supreme Court created the canons of treaty construc-
tion, which required that Indian treaties be interpreted as the tribe would have understood them; and
second, the court characterized these reserved rights as property rights. See generally Winans, 198 U.S.
371.
75. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
76. Id.
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construction counsel interpretation of treaty provisions in the manner the
tribes would have understood them.77 This case stands for the proposition
that when the federal government reserved land for the Indian tribes, it also
reserved sufficient water rights to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.78
This principle creates the legal basis for the water rights at issue in the
Adair litigation. In Winters, the court concluded that water rights were nec-
essary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, which was to create a pas-
toral people. 79 Thus, reserved water rights were impliedly reserved because
otherwise the reserved land would be worthless. 80 In Adair I, the court con-
sidered whether implied rights to water were necessary in order to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Klamath reservation.81 The court concluded that one
of the purposes of the reservation was to maintain the tribes' traditional
fishing lifestyle; thus, the tribes reserved sufficient water rights to fulfill
that purpose because otherwise the "hunting and fishing rights would be
worthless., 82 The Adair III court further held that water rights were impli-
edly reserved at the level necessary to support a productive fishery, because
otherwise the tribes' treaty fishing rights would be abrogated, a power that
only Congress can exercise.83
B. Adair I: Quantification Standard Announced
The Adair litigation arose at roughly the same time as Phase 2 of the
United States v. Washington litigation,84 and concerned similar issues: the
implied treaty right to habitat protection.85 Adair I began in 1975, when the
77. Id.
78. This seems to be at odds with the Winans holding that tribes reserved all rights not given away,
but Winans dealt with reserved rights to continue an old way of fife. See supra note 74. Because the
United States created a new way of life for the Fort Belknap Indians, it reserved the rights in the treaty,
not the tribes. The Winans doctrine of tribal reserved rights applies where water rights are reserved to
protect an old way of life. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
79. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
80. Which does comply with the canons of treaty construction. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81
(requiring that Indian treaties must be understood as the "unlettered" Indians would have understood
them, and as "justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those
whom they owe protection").
81. Adairl,478F. Supp. at345.
82. Id. at 346.
83. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76 ("and it has not done so here") (quoting Klamath Water
Users Prot. Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9 h Cir. 1999) cert. denied 531 U.S. 812 (2000)).
84. Phase 2 of US v. Washington was the continuation of the case heard by Judge Boldt concerning
harvest share under the Stevens' Treaties. In Phase 2, Judge Orrick limited the case to the legal issue
surrounding whether the treaties contained an implied right to habitat protection. He determined that the
most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken.
Thus, he held that the treaty fishing rights have an implied right of habitat protection. United States v.
Washington, 506 F. Supp. at 202. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed this decision, concluding
that the case lacked a concrete set of facts, and the court would be practicing judicial imprudence if it
ruled on the issue in the abstract. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357.
85. However, Adair I was decided before the district court decision in United States v. Washington,
and the Ninth Circuit decision in Adair II was decided before the en banc court ruled in Washington. For
a brief description of United States v. Washington, see infra n. 171.
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United States brought suit in the District Court of Oregon seeking a declara-
tion of water rights in the Williamson River drainage. In 1976, prompted by
the United States' initiation of the Adair suit, the state of Oregon initiated a
comprehensive adjudication of the Klamath Basin, which included the Wil-
liamson River. Later that year, both the state and the Klamath tribes inter-
vened in the federal suit. 86 A major impetus for initiating the suit revolved
around the lack of water for the wildlife in the Klamath Marsh. The Marsh,
and the surrounding rivers and lakes, were one of the main components of
the old reservation lands, historically used by the tribes for hunting water-
fowl and game, fishing, and gathering of edible plants.87 Due to irrigation
diversions, the Klamath Marsh now receives much less water than it did
seventy-five years ago, and is currently only about 10% open water.88 Ac-
cording to the court, a "50/50 balance" between open water and dry land is
necessary in order to encourage the growth of animals and desirable vegeta-
tion.89
Seeking to obtain water to revive the Marsh ecosystem, the United States
and tribes argued that the Klamath treaty reserved water rights to protect the
tribes' hunting and fishing lifestyle.90 Because Congress terminated the
Klamath reservation in the 1954 Termination Act, the state claimed that the
tribes no longer had a possessory interest in the land, thereby precluding the
ownership of water rights that the state argued were appurtenant to the
land.9' Judge Solomon resolved this issue in favor of the tribes by citing to
a savings provision of the Termination Act, which expressly left the tribes'
water rights untouched.92 Judge Solomon concluded that this interpretation
of the Act was consistent with the Ninth Circuit's rational in both Kimball I
and II, where the court ruled that the Termination Act did not effect the
tribes' hunting and fishing rights.93 Because any water rights that the tribes
had were appurtenant to the tribes' usufructuary rights, not the land, Judge
Solomon disposed of the state's argument that termination eliminated water
rights.94
Judge Solomon acknowledged that water rights exist where they are nec-
essary to effectuate the primary purposes of the reservation.95 However, he
concluded that the primary purpose of the Klamath reservation "was to pro-
vide an area for the exclusive occupation of the Indians so that they could
86. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1399.
87. Id. at 339.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. AdairL, 478 F. Supp. at 341-44.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 345 (citing Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a)).
93. Id. Kimball 1, 493 F.2d at 569; Kimball 11, 590 F.2d at 777 [holding that the Klamaths' hunting
and fishing rights survived the Termination Act and that the state could regulate these rights only to
support conservation].
94. Adair l 478 F. Supp. at 346.
95. Id. at 345.
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continue to be self-sufficient. ''96 According to the court, the treaty provided
two means for the Indians to be self-sufficient: first, it guaranteed that they
could continue their traditional way of life, which consisted of hunting,
fishing, trapping and gathering; second, the treaty encouraged the Indians to
adopt an agrarian way of life.97 Because maintaining the tribes' hunting
and fishing lifestyle was a primary purpose of the reservation, the tribes
hold reserved rights to effectuate this purpose.98 These water rights have a
priority date of "time immemorial," and extend to as much water as neces-
sary to protect the tribes' hunting and fishing rights, even "[i]f the preserva-
tion of these rights requires that the Marsh be maintained as wetlands." 99
The state argued that the court should not have exercised its jurisdiction
in the case because Oregon's basin-wide adjudication required federal court
abstention based on the Supreme Court's Colorado River doctrine.' °° In
Colorado River, the Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the
McCarran Amendment's goal of comprehensive water rights adjudication
and the federal courts "virtually unflagging duty"' 0' to exercise jurisdiction
given them.'0 2 The core policy of the McCarran Amendment, according to
the Supreme Court, is to avoid piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a
river system. 103 Because of this goal, the Court developed a new doctrine of
federal court abstention where concurrent jurisdiction between the federal
and state courts exists over water rights adjudications. The Court thought
this doctrine would promote wise judicial administration in the area of wa-
ter rights litigation, "giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation."'04 Thus the Colorado River doc-
trine directed lower federal courts to consider a number of factors in mak-
ing the determination whether or not abstention is appropriate, and weigh
96. Id.
97. Id. (finding further that the treaty provisions protecting the tribal members' hunting, fishing
and gathering fights were more important to the tribes' than the provisions encouraging agriculture
because hunting, fishing and gathering supplied the tribe with food and income, and supported their
traditional culture).
98. Id. See also supra n. 74-80 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 345-46 (stating that "without sufficient water to preserve the fish and wildlife on the
reservation lands, Indian hunting and fishing rights would be worthless"). It is important to note that
Judge Solomon misconstrued the nature of tribal reserved rights, stating that the federal government
withdrew the lands from the public domain to create the reservation and protect the hunting and fishing
rights. However, Winans made clear that the tribes' reserved the rights in the treaties because they
controlled all aspects of the land before it was ceded to the United States pursuant to the treaty. Winans,
198 U.S. at 380-81. Thus, the tribes reserved the land and the rights to themselves, while granting away
the rest of their rights and title to the surrounding lands. Nevertheless, the court's conclusion concerning
priority dates and the water rights necessary to effectuate the purposes of the reservation was nonethe-
less accurate.
100. Adair l1, 723 F.2d at 1399.
101. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
102. See generally id. The court characterized the primary issue in the case as whether the McCarran
Amendment eviscerated federal court jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1345 (suits brought by the United
States) in the area of water fights adjudication. Id. at 803.
103. Id. at 819.
104. ld. at 816.
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these factors against the obligation to exercise jurisdiction in "a carefully
considered judgment." 105
In Adair I, Judge Solomon concluded that he was not deciding issues that
would conflict with the state's adjudication or create piecemeal litigation
because of the limited jurisdiction of the federal court, as the federal court
was only going to decide the "broad questions[,]" leaving the state to "un-
dertake the specific allocation of water."' 6 Consequently, instead of ab-
staining, he limited his ruling to the issues of federal law issues, such as the
nature and priority of the federal water rights and the legal standard to be
used in quantifying the water right.10 7 But, following the guidance of Colo-
rado River, he left the application of the standard, and the fact-intensive
quantification of the tribes' reserved water rights to the state.1°8 However,
the district court retained jurisdiction over issues relating to construction,
effectuation, modification or enforcement of the standard that might
arise. 109
C. Adair II: Incorporating the Supreme Court's Moderate Living Standard
1. The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,"10 a case decided
while the Adair case was pending appeal, the Supreme Court refined and
clarified the Colorado River doctrine. In San Carlos Apache, the Court
stated that while federal court adjudication of the water rights may be prac-
tical and wise in the abstract, federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction
in suits concerning water rights adjudication where doing so would create
the "possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between
the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured decision making, and
confusion over the disposition of property rights.""' Avoiding tension be-
tween state and federal courts serves as the focal point for much of the
105. Id. at 819. The court cited five factors weighing against the exercise of federal court jurisdic-
tion: (1) the strong Congressional policy to avoid piecemeal litigation, (2) the posture of the federal suit,
(3) the extent of involvement of state water rights, (4) the inconvenience of the federal forum, and (5)
whether the United States is otherwise involved in state water proceedings. Id.
106. SeeAdairi1, 723 F.2dat 1404.
107. Id.
108. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816.
109. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. This authority derives from the nature of declaratory judg-
ments, which allow for supplemental relief. See infra n. 197.
110. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) ("San Carlos Apache").
The question before the Supreme Court in San Carlos Apache was whether federal courts must abstain
in favor of state adjudications where the federal suits are brought by Indian tribes. The tribes argued
that, unlike Colorado, the states at issue in this case (Arizona and Montana) had disclaimed jurisdic-
tional authority over Indian property. The Supreme Court held that considerations of wise judicial ad-
ministration found in Colorado River apply to this case; and further that the McCarran Amendment
removed any limitations on state court jurisdiction of Indian water rights because to rule otherwise
would eviscerate the Amendment's objective due to "the ubiquitous nature of Indian water rights in the
Southwest." Id. at 563-67.
111. Id. at 569.
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Colorado River abstention jurisprudence. However, the Court did discuss a
number of scenarios where the dismissal of the federal suit in this situation
may not be warranted. 1 2 The most important of these considerations in the
Adair case was that by the time the state filed its motion to dismiss, the
federal suit was "well enough along that its dismissal would itself constitute
a waste of judicial resources."' 13 However, the most heavily weighted ele-
ment of Colorado River abstention continues to be the underlying McCar-
ran Amendment policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water
rights."
4
The United States and the tribes initially tried to avoid the abstention
doctrine entirely, seizing on the argument they would later use in United
States v. Oregon:"5 that the McCarran Amendment, which waives the
United States' sovereign immunity,' 6 does not apply because the Oregon
adjudication was an administrative proceeding, not a "suit," within the
meaning of the McCarran Amendment." 7 This argument raised an impor-
tant policy consideration given the Supreme Court's declaration that the
McCarran Amendment seeks to promote wise judicial administration and
conservation of judicial resources." 8 Inclusion of administrative proceed-
ings within the scope of Colorado River abstention could actually create
more litigation by requiring the parties to litigate through the entire admin-
istrative process, then the state courts and the United States Supreme Court,
rather than settling the federal law issue relatively quickly in federal court.
Further, if any of the subsequent reviewing courts invalidate the legal find-
ings of the Water Resources Department, then the Department would have
to rework part of the almost thirty year process to fix the errors.
The possibility of having to revise the water allocations because of the
flawed legal conclusions of an administrative body unschooled in the appli-
cation of federal law defeats the goal of certainty and finality of water
rights that a basin-wide adjudication theoretically promotes. Thus, while the
Colorado River doctrine avoids piecemeal adjudication of water rights on
the one hand-by limiting federal court involvement-there is, on the other
hand, a resulting loss in certainty and finality in the administrative decision
if later reviewing courts determine the legal conclusions of the administra-
tive body are incorrect.
112. Id. (the three situations are: (1) where the state agrees to stay its disposition of the issue pend-
ing federal disposition of the action, (2) where at the time the motion to dismiss is filed, the federal suit
is well enough along that its dismissal would itself constitute a waste of judicial resources, (3) where
arguments for and against deference are closely matched, the fact that a federal suit was brought by
Indians on their own behalf for the disposition of only Indian rights should be figured into the balance).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra nn. 130-43 and accompanying text.
116. By stating that "consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit." 43 U.S.C.
§ 666.
117. Adair HI, 723 F.2d at 1405.
118. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816.
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Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, citing Supreme
Court precedent for the principle of avoiding an "overly technical applica-
tion of the McCarran Amendment."'1 9 The court assumed, without decid-
ing, that the Oregon water rights adjudication was not too informal to qual-
ify as a "suit" within the meaning of the language of the McCarran
Amendment, or as a comprehensive state adjudication within the meaning
of Colorado River and San Carlos Apache.120
2. The Ninth Circuit's Resolution of the Colorado River Abstention
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected the United States' and tribal argu-
ments that the McCarran Amendment did not apply, the court concluded
that the district court did not err in deciding the case because the Adair I
decision properly coordinated federal and state resolution of the water
rights in order to avoid tension between the forums. The district court ac-
complished this by limiting its jurisdiction to "the legal principles govern-
ing the extent of and priority among water rights arising under federal
law... [leaving the] quantification and administration of [those] rights" to
the state.12 The Ninth Circuit cited the limited nature of the district court
decision and the posture of the case, which counseled in favor of federal
court resolution of the Adair I issues because the state adjudication was at a
very earlier stage in the proceeding, while the federal proceeding was al-
ready complete. 122 Further, the district court avoided the tension between
the federal and state forums by only deciding federal law issues and avoid-
ing state law matters, thereby allowing each forum to consider questions
within their expertise.
23
3. Extending the Moderate Living Standard to Reserved Water Rights
On the merits of the case the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district
court's decision, making only a small modification to the quantification
119. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1405 (citing United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S.
520, 525 (1971)).
120. Id. The Ninth Circuit later determined that the Oregon adjudication procedures satisfied the
requirements of a "suit" under the McCarran Amendment because the administrative findings were
reviewable by Oregon courts and the intent of Congress was to encompass the water adjudication proce-
dures that existed at the time the Amendment was passed. See United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758,
765-67 (9" Cir. 1994). See infra nn. 130-143 and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 1404.
122. Id. at 1404-07.
123. Id. In making this determination the court relied heavily on the three situations that would
allow the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in the face of a concurrent state proceeding as stated by
the Supreme Court in San Carlos Apache. See supra n. 118. The court concluded that the state proceed-
ing had, in effect, been stayed; because in the seven years since the state initiated the proceedings, it had
not progressed past the investigation stage. The court concluded that the policies of the McCarran
Amendment would not be served by dismissing the case because the Oregon adjudication was in a
nascent state, and the federal suit was "well enough along [so] that its dismissal would itself constitute a
waste of judicial resources."
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standard. The court affirmed the district court holding that the Klamath
reservation was created to fulfill the duel purposes of creating an agricul-
tural society and maintaining the traditional ways of life. 124 However, the
court qualified Judge Solomon's determination that the reserved water
rights entitled the tribes to enough water to protect the tribes' hunting and
fishing rights, stating that the treaty entitled the tribes to only "the amount
of water necessary to support its hunting and fishing rights as currently ex-
ercised to maintain the livelihood of Tribe members, not as these rights
were exercised by the Tribe in 1864."' 125 The Ninth Circuit clarified this
"livelihood standard," by quoting the Supreme Court, which held that the
tribes' water rights "secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living."
126
The court thought that this qualification avoided the "comprehensive envi-
ronmental servitude" that concerned the Ninth Circuit panel in United
States v. Washington. 127
D. United States v. Oregon: Questioning the Nature of Oregon's
Adjudication Procedure
1. Arguing against the McCarran Amendment's Application to the Oregon
Proceeding
The state of Oregon initiated the Klamath Basin Adjudication in 1975, by
issuing notices of intent to adjudicate to potential claimants. 128 Oregon's
notice of intent to adjudicate came only months after the United States filed
suit in federal court to determine water rights in the Williamson River
drainage, 129 thereby raising the Colorado River abstention problems. 30 The
Klamath tribes' reserved rights were among the rights at issue in the United
States' suit. Despite the 1975 notice to over 25,000 potential claimants, the
state took virtually no action to initiate the proceedings. 131 Consequently,
124. Id. at 1409.
125. Id. at 1414-15 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit drew this qualification from the Supreme
Court's final disposition of Phase I of United States v. Washington, in Passenger Fishing Vessel. The
Supreme Court was persuaded to hear the case after the Supreme Court of Washington issued an opinion
declaring that the State lacked the authority to implement the Boldt decision. Justice Stevens, writing for
the court, largely affirmed Judge Boldt's fifty percent apportionment of the fish runs; but held that the
apportionment could be adjusted downward if a challenging party could show that the full amount was
not needed to provide the Indians with a moderate living. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at
686.
126. Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1415 (citing Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686).
127. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1381. See supra n. 84.
128. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762-65. Oregon instituted its present system for adjudicat-
ing water rights in 1909. That system required that all post-1909 water rights would obtained through a
permit system; leaving pre-1909 rights as undetermined vested rights. Only the pre-1909 vested rights
would be required to participate in future adjudication proceedings to quantify the undetermined rights.
129. Adair H, 723 F.2d at 1399.
130. See supra nn. 107-114 and accompanying text.
131. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1406.
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the state had to reissue notices of intent adjudicate to potential claimants in
1990, some 15 years after the original notices went out. 132 The second
round of notices prompted the United States to file suit in federal district
court to challenge Oregon's adjudication procedure; shortly thereafter, the
Klamath tribes intervened.
133
The United States argued that the McCarran Amendment's waiver of the
United States' sovereign immunity was not applicable to the Oregon adju-
dication procedure because the adjudication was not a "suit," and because it
was not comprehensive.1 34 The first argument seizes on the nature of the
Oregon adjudication, where an administrative body, the Water Resources
Department, handles the adjudication. Because of the role the Water Re-
sources Department plays in the adjudication, the United States argued that
Oregon's water rights adjudication "does not constitute a 'suit' but rather an
'administrative proceeding' outside the plain language of the McCarran
Amendment." 135 Thus, the argument went, the McCarran Amendment's
waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity did not apply to the Ore-
gon adjudication. 36 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that Congress
clearly intended to encompass a broad range of comprehensive adjudication
procedures in enacting the McCarran Amendment because administrative
agencies are "at the core of most 'comprehensive state systems for adjudi-
cation of water rights' contemplated by the McCarran Amendment.'' 37
132. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762.
133. Id.
134. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Oregon, described the Oregon adjudication procedure as
requiring those with undetermined claims to "appear and submit proof of their claims before" the Water
Resources Department. The Department then
"accepts claims and objections to claims, surveys the river system, takes evidence and
holds hearings regarding contested claims. [Or. Rev. Stat.] at §§ 539.070, 539.100,
539.110, 539.120. After these hearings, the OWRD makes findings of fact and an order de-
termining the parties' water rights. Id. at § 539.130. This order is effective upon issuance
unless a party wishes to contest the order and files a bond. Id. at § 539.130(4). After the
order is filed, a judicial hearing is scheduled and notice of that hearing is given to the par-
ticipants. Id. at § 539.130. Parties objecting to the department's order must file written ex-
ceptions with the court in order to preserve their objections. Id. at § 539.150. If no objec-
tions are filed, the court must enter a judgment affirming the order. Id. at § 539.150(3).
Otherwise, a hearing is held at which contesting parties may offer evidence as in a normal
civil case. Id. at §§ 539.150(i), 539.150(3). The court may remand the case to the OWRD
or other referee for further findings, followed by another judicial hearing. Id. at §
539.150(3). At the final judicial hearing, the court reviews the exceptions and then enters a
judgment affirming or modifying the order as it considers proper. Id. at § 539.150(4). This
judgment is appealable to the Oregon Court of Appeals in the same manner as any other
civil judgment." Id.
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 764.
135. Id. at 765.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 766 (stating further that "at the time the McCarran Amendment was passed, Oregon's
adjudicatory scheme was firmly established... and had been duplicated in Arizona, California and Ne-
vada (the home of Senator McCarran, author of the amendment)"). In support of its position that the
McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to the Oregon adjudication, the
United States argued that waivers of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed" in the
statutory language; relying on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Idaho. 508 U.S. at 6. The
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The United States' based its second argument against application of the
McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity on the adjudica-
tion's less-than-comprehensive nature. 138 This argument pointed out that
not all water users in the basin were a party to the adjudication, since post-
1909 permit holders were not included, and the adjudication did not involve
all the water rights in the basin, as groundwater rights were not included.
39
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the adjudication did not have to include "set-
tled determinations," concluding instead that the adjudication need only
consist of "existing controversies."' 140 The court similarly disposed of the
groundwater claim, holding that the "greater legal recognition of the con-
nection between ground and surface waters" was too recent to infer that
Congress intended to included all "hydrologically connected" water rights
in comprehensive stream adjudications under the McCarran Amendment.
14
2. The Klamath Tribes' Due Process Claim
The Klamaths' due process claim rested on the Fourteenth Amendment,
which guarantees a "fair trial before a fair tribunal."'' 42 The tribes argued
that because the state opposed Klamath treaty rights in the past-citing the
Oregon Department of Justice's vigorous argument against tribal reserved
rights in Adair I and I-the tribes would not receive a "fair trial" before an
Oregon administrative body. To prevail in this claim, the tribes needed to
"show an unacceptable probability of actual bias on the part of those.. .who
have power over their claims."'' 43 But the Ninth Circuit held the connection
between the Department of Justice and the Water Resources Department
was too tenuous to provide an "unacceptable probability of bias," because
the tribes failed to show that the Oregon Department of Justice would have
any significant role to play in the adjudication.' 44 The court's holding
turned on the Water Department's autonomous role in quantification of the
water rights, and the possible review of its final decision by Oregon state
court judges. 45 However, the Water Resources Department wholly adopted
the position taken by the Oregon Department of Justice on the meaning of
United States argued that the McCarran Amendment waived immunity for "suits," but not for adminis-
trative proceedings. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 765-66. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the McCarran Amendment expressly waived immunity, and concluding otherwise
would ignore the intended scope of the McCarran Amendment, which was meant to encompass "com-
prehensive water rights adjudications." Id. (citing United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. at 6).
138. Id. at 767-70.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768
141. Id.
142. Id. at 771.
143. Id. (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
144. Id. (stating further that "the legal issues with respect to the tribe's rights have already been
decided by this court and we must presume that they will be followed by [the Water Resources Depart-
ment] and the state courts").
145. Id.
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Adair I and H.146 Thus, the United States v. Oregon court may have over-
stated the independence of the Water Department, and its reliance on this
assumption may have been misplaced.
PART III: CLARIFYING THE QUANTIFICATION STANDARD: JUDGE PANNER'S
ADAIR III DECISION
Despite the quantification standard announced by the Adair I and Adair
II courts, which recognized the tribes' reserved water rights as necessary to
protect their hunting and fishing right at a level that would provide a mod-
erate living, the state water resources department, aided by the Oregon De-
partment of Justice, issued a preliminary standard for quantification of the
rights that was at odds with the Adair I and II decisions. The preliminary
standard stated that the tribes claimed water rights are "proper if the record
shows that the claimed amount is the minimum quantity of water necessary
to protect treaty fish and wildlife resources as they existed in 1979. "147 The
Department of Justice and the Water Department extrapolated this standard
from the "as currently exercised" language of Adair 11.148 The problem with
this standard is that it severely limits tribal water rights because the tribes'
fish resources were almost non-existent in 1979.149 The state's quantifica-
tion standard is an extremely narrow reading of the Adair II holding, and
entirely overlooks the Ninth Circuit's moderate living standard, as well as
Supreme Court precedent prohibiting anyone but Congress from abrogating
tribal treaty rights. 50 In response to the announcement of this standard, the
United States and the tribes petitioned the district court to exercise its re-
tained jurisdiction over the case in order to clarify the standard announced
in Adair I and H. 
151
A. The Limited Scope of Jurisdiction
Judge Panner's exercise of jurisdiction in Adair III was similar to that
exercised by Judge Solomon in Adair L The central holding of Adair I was
to announce the quantification standard that Oregon would apply in the
comprehensive water rights proceeding.152 Judge Solomon characterized the
tribes' water right as including as much water as necessary to fulfill the
146. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 973.
147. Id.
148. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1405 (stating that the treaty entitled the tribes to only "the amount of
water necessary to support hunting and fishing rights as currently exercised to maintain the livelihood of
Tribe members, not as these rights were exercised by the Tribe in 1864").
149. See Kandra, 145 F. Supp.2d at 1197, 1201 (stating that the fish harvest is severely reduced or
"in the case of the suckers, non-existent").
150. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903). See also Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
151. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1274-75.
152. Adair 1, 478 F. Supp. at 345. For a brief summary of Judge Solomon's five holdings in the
decision, see Adair I1, 723 F.2d at 1399.
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purposes of the reservation: to both maintain the traditional hunting and
fishing rights, and encourage agriculture. 53 Therefore, Judge Solomon lim-
ited his jurisdiction to the federal law issues of the nature and priority of the
reserved rights at issue in the case, and leaving the determination of the
scope of those rights up to Oregon's basin-wide adjudication.5 4 This bifur-
cation allowed each forum to determine the issues within its expertise,
thereby satisfying the Colorado River doctrine's requirement of "wise judi-
cial administration."
1 55
Exercising the court's retained jurisdiction,156 Judge Panner similarly
limited his scope to the consideration of the federal law issues of whether
the tribes had a water right to support reserved gathering rights, and
"whether and to what extent the 'moderate living' standard applies in quan-
tifying the tribes' water rights." Both of these issues were consistent with
the Adair I and H holdings, but because of the dispute between the parties
over the interpretation of those decisions, Judge Panner clarified the earlier
decisions. 57 Judge Solomon anticipated such a problem and provided a
means for its resolution, retaining jurisdiction in the district court "as may
be necessary or appropriate for the construction and effectuation of this
judgment."'' 58 The clarification that Judge Panner supplied in Adair III thus
falls within the "construction and effectuation" that Judge Solomon envi-
sioned as potentially necessary.
B. The Gathering Right Reasserted
Because the state concluded that Adair I and II did not authorize water
rights to protect gathering rights, the United States and the tribes also
sought a declaration that the earlier court decisions included the protection
of gathering rights, along with hunting and fishing rights. They argued that
the treaty reserved to the tribes "the exclusive right of... gathering edible
roots, seeds, and berries [within the reservation boundaries].', 59 The United
States and the tribes also maintained that the declaratory judgment issued
by the Adair I court repeatedly referred to the trapping and gathering
rights.160 The state's argument centered on somewhat inconsistent state-
ments in the Adair I and 1I decisions concerning the nature and scope of the
reserved rights.' 6' In both cases, the courts definitively stated that the tribes
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1406-07.
156. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1274-75.
157. Id.
158. Id. See supra n. 15.
159. Treaty with the Klamath, 16 Stat. 707 (reserving to the Indians "the exclusive right of taking
fish in the streams and lakes... and gathering edible roots, seeds, and berries.").
160. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1275.
161. Oregon Water Resources Department, Attorney General advice relating to Bureau of Indian
Affairs and Klamath Tribes' claims, <http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/pdfs/kba v-vi-adv.pdf>
(last accessed December 3, 2003). The inconsistent statements come from the lack of uniformity the
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have reserved water rights to hunt and fish, but only sporadically included
that the treaty also guaranteed reserved rights to gather, thereby creating
confusion. 62 However, Judge Panner had little trouble determining that the
tribes have reserved rights for gathering.
The state's arguments on this point represented a restrictive view of the
Adair I and II decisions, the treaty language, and Supreme Court precedent
concerning reserved rights. Article I of the Treaty clearly recognized the
tribes' gathering rights. 163 The state's argument that the treaty adequately
reserved hunting and fishing rights, but not gathering rights, failed to grasp
the principles laid down in Winans, that treaties made with Indian tribes are
to be interpreted as the tribe would have understood it at the time they
signed the treaty. 164 This argument also overlooks the Adair I and H court's
framing of the issue as whether the tribes had hunting, fishing and gathering
rights, 165 as well as the Adair I court's repeated reference to the tribes' gath-
ering rights.166 Based on these factors, Judge Panner rightly held that the
sporadic exclusion of "gathering rights," from Adair I and II resulted from
an oversight, not a desire to exclude the gathering rights.
C. Establishing A Right to a Productive Habitat
The primary dispute in Adair III revolved around applying the "moderate
living" doctrine announced in Adair 11.167 Judge Panner concluded that "any
argument that would have the practical effect of quantifying the Tribes'
reserved rights at a level that would not support productive habitat is re-
jected."'168 Drawing on foundational aspects of federal Indian law, Judge
Panner based his determination on the fact that this would "result in abro-
gating the Tribes' treaty rights... [and] 'only Congress can abrogate Indian
courts used when discussing the reserved rights, as the courts interchangeably used the phrases "hunting,
fishing and gathering rights," and "hunting and fishing rights," when referring to the reserved rights.
162. Adair 1, 478 F. Supp. at 345 (stating that "the Indians are still entitled to as much water ... as
they need to protect their hunting and fishing rights"). But cf Id. (describing the purposes of the reserva-
tion, "[the treaty] ensured that the Indians could continue their traditional way of life which included
hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering.. .The treaty granted the Indians an implied right to as much
water was necessary to fulfill these purposes").
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81 (requiring that Indian treaties must be understood as the "unlet-
tered" Indians would have understood them, and as "justice and reason demand, in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those whom they owe protection").
165. See Adair 1, 478 F. Supp. at 345 (stating at the beginning of its discussion of the Indians' rights,
that "the Indians have hunted, fished and gathered food on the reservation since time immemorial," and
that the "Treaty of 1864 secured for the Indians the exclusive right to fish and gather."); and Adair II,
723 F.2d at 1408 (framing the issue in the subject heading of Part 111, A, as "A Reservation of Water to
Accompany the Tribe's Right to Hunt, Fish and Gather"). This argument also overlooks the Ninth
Circuit's incorporation of the Kimball holdings into its decision; concluding that to deny reserved water
for the "rights recognized in Kimball I and II.. would effectively nullify the substance of those deci-
sions." Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1412 (emphasis added).
166. SeeAdairl ,478 F. Supp. 336.
167. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1275.
168. Id. at 1275-76.
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treaty rights'... 'and it has not done so here."" 69 Judge Panner concluded
that the only meaningful way to fulfill the purposes of the reservation was
for the state to quantify "the reserved water right so that productive habitat
can be supported."'' 70 The court likely drew this conclusion from the district
court's decision in Phase 2 of United States v. Washington;171 however,
Adair III differs from that case in that the United States and the Klamath
tribes brought a suit with a concrete set of facts to which the habitat protec-
tion standard could be applied with certainty.172 As a result, the judicial
prudence argument that prevailed before in Phase 2 of United States v.
Washington173 should not apply to this case.
D. Clarifying The Quantification Standard
Although Adair I1"s recognition of the treaty right to habitat protection
may have arguably been the most important aspect of the decision, the
clarification of the quantification standard, providing that the tribes were
entitled to enough water to protect the their hunting, fishing and gathering
rights, as announced by the Adair I and I courts, 174 represents the core of
the decision. Judge Panner determined that the Adair I and 1I courts created
a two-step process to quantify the tribes' reserved water rights. 75 The first
step of the process "does not involve an analysis of any actual beneficial
use... or actual harvest.., on a fixed day in history;"' 176 instead, it deter-
mines how much water the tribes need in order to supply tribal members
with a moderate livelihood from their hunting, fishing and gathering
rights. 177 This is essentially the standard used to quantify the tribes' water
rights. The quantification of the tribes' water rights must focus on fulfilling
169. Id. (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738; and Klamath Water Users Protection Ass'n
v. Patterson, 204 F.3d at 1213).
170. Adair 11, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1276 (finding that the purposes of the reservation include protect-
ing the hunting and fishing rights as well as supporting agriculture).
171. In United States v. Washington, Judge Orrick concluded that the Stevens' treaties of the Pacific
Northwest entitled the tribes to more than the opportunity to dip their nets into the waters and bring
them out empty. His conclusion was based largely on treaty construction, concluding that the treaty
negotiators assured the tribes that they would be able to continue their traditional way of life notwith-
standing the impending westward expansion. Relying on the canons of construction, Judge Orrick held
that the tribes have an implied right to productive habitat to effectuate the treaty fishing right and pro-
vide the tribes with a moderate living. See generally United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187
(W.D. Wash. 1980) (Phase 2).
172. The Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Orrick's decision as violative of judicial prudence because the
case did not contain a concrete set of facts to apply the habitat protection standard to. See United States
v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353,1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
173. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357.
174. Adairl, 478 F. Supp. 336, Adair I1, 723 F.2d 1394.
175. Adair ll, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1276.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Adair 1, 478 F. Supp. at 345-46) (stating that "[t]he Indians are still entitled to as
much water on the Reservation lands as they need to protect their hunting and fishing rights. If the
preservation of these rights requires that the Marsh be maintained as wetlands and that the forest be
maintained on a sustained yield basis, then the Indians are entitled to whatever water is necessary to
achieve those results").
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the purposes of the reservation, 178 which was: to support Klamath agricul-
ture and maintain the tribes' traditional way of life by supplying a fishery
that supports the moderate living needs of tribal members. 1
79
In Adair II, the Ninth Circuit modified the quantification standard, creat-
ing a second step in the allocation process derived from the Supreme
Court's moderate living standard announced in Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel. 180 The moderate living standard requires that the tribes receive only the
amount of water that is necessary to provide the members with a moderate
living. 18 1 Thus, tribes are not entitled to the amount of water that supported
hunting, fishing and gathering at the time of the treaty, unless no lesser
amount would supply the tribes with a moderate living.' 82 In adopting this
standard, the Ninth Circuit rejected Oregon's argument that the water rights
will impose a "comprehensive wilderness servitude," a concern that led the
Ninth Circuit to its avoidance of the habitat protection standard in United
States v. Washington, Phase 2.183 However, Judge Panner concluded that
courts should not apply the moderate living standard until the adjudicator
first quantifies the tribes' full water rights. 184 Finally, the burden of showing
that the water rights allocated to the tribes' is excessive, in terms of the
amount of water necessary to supply a moderate living, is on the party op-
posing the tribal rights.
185
As applied to treaty harvest share in Passenger Fishing Vessel, the Su-
preme Court's moderate living standard serves as a reasonable method for
dealing with the change in circumstances that occurred since the treaties
were signed in 1855, while keeping the value of the rights largely intact.
The moderate living standard recognizes that the treaty tribes are still enti-
tled to a significant portion of the fish runs.186 However, as applied to re-
served water rights to protect fish and wildlife, the moderate living standard
178. Because the Klamath reservation was terminated, the remaining reserved water rights for
agriculture are for allotee and Walton rights.
179. Id. (citing and quoting Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1409). Consistent with the Winters doctrine, the
Klamath tribes' would not have ceded away all their lands without reserving to the water that made the
lands valuable and allowed them to survive on the smaller tract. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. Therefore,
following Winters, the Adair II1 court held that the appropriate quantification standard for the Oregon
adjudication is one that allocates enough water to the tribes' to maintain a fishery that supplies tribal
members with a moderate livelihood.
180. See Adair I1, 723 F.2d at 1415. While initially quantified in the first step, the scope of the
tribes' reserved water rights is not finally quantified until the Water Department applies the moderate
living standard. In applying the moderate living standard, the Water Department adjusts the initial
allocation of water to reflect the level required to meet the current tribal moderate living need.
181. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1414.
182. Id.
183. See United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1381 (9th Cir. 1983).
184. Adair 111, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1246 (stating that "the initial quantification of water rights is a
separate analysis from the 'moderate living' standard. The adjudicator is called upon to first quantify the
Tribes' water rights to establish an allocation of water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. Only after
the quantification stage can the 'moderate living' doctrine be considered to possibly adjust the quantifi-
cation").
185. Id. at 1277-78.
186. Passanger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658.
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must be carefully applied so as to avoid abrogating the tribes' rights. Judge
Panner was quick to note that the fishing rights at issue in Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel "could be reduced without completely frustrating the purpose of
the reservation."'' 87 He then concluded that the Klamath tribes' water rights
for habitat do not lend themselves to such a reduction because "ultimately
the water level cannot be reduced to a level below which is required to sup-
port productive habitat," regardless of the number of members the tribes
maintain.188 In so holding, Judge Panner avoided abrogating the tribes'
treaty rights by narrowing the scope of the moderate living standard. In-
stead of applying to the whole water allocation, the Water Department
would only apply the moderate living standard to the amount of water allo-
cated to fulfill the purpose of the reservation that is beyond the level needed
to support a productive habitat.
PART IV: CLOSING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS TO THE KLAMATH:
ADAIR IV'S RIPENESS HOLDING
Following Judge Panner's decision, the state of Oregon and several water
users appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit. The state and the individuals
argued that the case was not ripe and claimed that the district court should
have dismissed the case, on the basis of the Supreme Court's Colorado
River abstention doctrine. 89 Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Tallman
agreed with Oregon's argument that the case was not ripe because the quan-
tification standard issued by the Water Department needed further factual
development before the court could deem it a final action. 90 The court con-
cluded that because the standard could be modified at two different levels,
in the Water Department's administrative hearings and in its final adminis-
trative findings, it was not a final decision and was not ripe for review. 91
By basing the decision on ripeness grounds, the Ninth Circuit avoided rul-
ing on the merits of the habitat protection standard announced by Judge
Panner. 
1 92
187. Adair Ill, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1277.
188. Id. While the level of water needed to support a productive habitat is not self-evident, once
biologists determine the proper level, the tribes' and the Water Department would have a fixed, easy to
apply standard.
189. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 974.
190. Id. at 975-76.
191. Id.
192. This is not the first time that the Ninth Circuit used procedural grounds to vacate a decision
finding a treaty implied habitat protection right. In Phase 2 of United States v. Washington, the district
court held that the Stevens' Treaties of the Pacific Northwest created an implied right to habitat protec-
tion, because "the most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of
fish to be taken." On appeal, an en banc Ninth Circuit concluded that it would be judicially imprudent to
announce this right without a concrete set of facts to base the decision on; stating, "the measure of the
State's obligation will depend for its precise legal formulation on all of the facts presented by a particu-
lar dispute." United States v. Washington, 506 F.Supp. at 203; United States v. Washington, 758 F.2d at
1357.
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More importantly, the federal courthouse doors were essentially closed to
the Klamath concerning their water rights until the state completes the
snail-like Klamath Basin adjudication. This is because all standards, find-
ings and conclusions made by the agency and the state courts are subject to
review by some higher authority. 193 Before that higher authority has ruled,
the decision is not final, in the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, and thus not ripe
for review in federal court.
A. Ducking the Habitat Issue Again
1. The Nature of the Klamath Basin Adjudication
The Ninth Circuit's ripeness holding was a product of the nature of the
Oregon water rights adjudication procedure. After the United States and the
Klamath tribes filed their claims in the adjudication, the Water Department
solicited advice from the Oregon Department of Justice, 194 which concluded
that the tribes were entitled only to "the minimum amount of water neces-
sary to support the tribes' fishing and hunting rights as they were exercised
contemporaneously with the Adair decision."' 95 The Water Department
adopted this interpretation in a "Summary and Preliminary Evaluation" of
water rights, which contained the preliminary standard to be applied in the
quantification of the Klamath tribes' water rights.196 The next step in the
adjudication was the filing of contests against the claims for water made by
parties to the adjudication. 97 An administrative panel will then hear the
cases and issue proposed orders, which the Water Department will review.
193. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 974.
194. Cf. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 764 (where the court emphasized the separateness of
the two agencies and assured the Klamath tribes that the Water Department would not be unduly influ-
enced by the Oregon Department of Justice bias against tribal treaty fights).
195. Id. The Oregon Department of Justice (ORDOJ) reached this conclusion after considering the
Adair decisions and concluding that they were open to interpretation on both the scope of the fight and
what time period serves as the basis for determining the level of fishing that the standard must protect.
The ORDOJ decided that the Adair II court sought to place limits "on a fight that might otherwise
actually create a 'wilderness servitude' on the former reservation" by stating that the tribes were entitled
to the minimum amount of water necessary "to support their hunting and fishing rights as currently
exercised." While acknowledging the "force" of the Bureau of Indian Affairs argument to the contrary,
the ORDOJ concluded that the "as currently exercised" language limited the water right to that which
would protect the hunting and fishing fights as they were exercised in 1979, effectively ignoring Adair
1's invocation of the moderate living standard. See Oregon Water Resources Department, Attorney
General advice relating to Bureau of Indian Affairs and Klamath Tribes' claims,
<http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/pdfs/kba v-vi-adv.pdf> (last accessed December 3, 2003).
However, the ORDOJ failed to acknowledge that the Adair 11 court specifically rejected the argument
that the standard would create a wilderness servitude. 723 F.2d at 1414. Instead, the Adair 11 court held
that the tribes are not entitled to the amount of water that existed at the time of the treaty, unless no
lesser amount will supply the tribe with a moderate living. Id. Thus, the tribes might be entitled to the
amount of water that existed at the time of the treaty, if no less would supply them with a moderate
living, regardless of the level at which the tribes' currently exercise their hunting and fishing fights.
196. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 973.
197. Over 5,654 contests have been filed and were consolidated into five cases so that proceedings
could be initiated and heard by an administrative panel pursuant to OR. Admin. R. 137-003-0515. Adair
IV, 338 F.3d at 973-74.
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The Department will then issue a final determination of water rights that is
subject to review in the Oregon courts, and possibly to the United States
Supreme Court. 198 The extended timeline of the adjudication allowed the
Ninth Circuit to frame the case as a challenge to a non-final administrative
decision, which it found as being unripe. As a result, the Oregon District
Court and the Ninth Circuit are likely no longer involved in resolving dis-
putes that arise out of the Klamath adjudication. This leaves the tribes' with
having to appeal to the likely unsympathetic Supreme Court' 99 as the only
federal forum to protect their federal reserved water rights from the prob-
able narrow interpretations of state courts.
2. The Ripeness Ruling
Ripeness is a threshold hurdle that all cases must satisfy, and in Adair II,
the Ninth Circuit held the ripeness test was not satisfied under the circum-
stances of the Adair III facts. Ripeness exists in two forms: prudential ripe-
ness and constitutional ripeness. The court acknowledged that there was no
doubt that the case satisfied the constitutional ripeness requirements, as
there was a substantial controversy between the parties that was immedi-
ate. 20 0 The second component, prudential ripeness, is governed by two fac-
tors: first, "the fitness of the issues for judicial discretion," and second, "the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration., 20' The ripeness
doctrine functions to prevent the courts from prematurely entangling them-
selves in disagreements over administrative policies, while protecting ad-
ministrative agencies from judicial interference until a decision has been
202formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way.
In Adair IV, the Ninth Circuit stated that a claim is fit for review if it is
primarily legal, does not require further factual development, and the chal-
lenged action is final.203 The court then went on to hold that the case was
not fit for review for two nearly identical reasons. First, further factual de-
velopment was needed to "establish what standard Oregon will actually
apply," because "Oregon has not yet applied any final standard to the water
claims of the United States and the Tribes.' 2° Second, there remained steps
in the process where the standard could be administratively altered, thus the
198. Id. This whole adjudication process has already taken more than twenty-seven years and will
likely take many more.
199. See David Getches, Conquering the Cultural Fronteir: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal L. Rev. 1573 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court has begun to depart
from traditional Indian law principles, in favor of a subjective approach that twists tribal rights to fit the
Court's perceptions of non-Indian interests).
200. Id. at 975.
201. Id.
202. Winter v. California Medical Review, Inc., 900 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1989).
203. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 975 (quoting Winter v. California Medical Review, Inc., 900 F.2d at
1325).
204. Id. at 976.
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court deemed the agency action "nowhere near final. 2 °5 Essentially, both
reasons that the issue was not fit for review turned on the characterization
of the agency action as not being final.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the second aspect of prudential
ripeness, hardship to the parties from withholding judicial review, was not
satisfied.20 6 The court concluded that if the Water Department applied the
wrong standard, the parties could still seek review in the Oregon courts and
the United States Supreme Court, and that a declaration of water rights
from a federal court would not provide any immediate relief because the
Water Department would still have to apply the standard in calculating the
federal and tribal water rights.20 7 Although the United States and the Tribes
sought a clarification of the Adair I and II standard, the court characterized
the relief sought as the distribution of water and concluded that there would
be little hardship to the parties because no relief could be offered, as federal
courts cannot quantify water rights where there is an ongoing comprehen-
sive state adjudication that satisfies the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment.20 8 The Ninth Circuit failed to reconcile these statements with
the reality that a clarified quantification standard from a federal court would
supply the tribes with all the relief they needed. Because the Oregon De-
partment of Justice and the Water Department read the Adair II quantifica-
tion standard extremely narrowly, the tribes stand to lose a significant
amount of water in the adjudication. A broader and more clearly defined
federal standard, as supplied by Judge Panner in Adair III, would mandate
that the Water Department allocate more water to the tribes', thus granting
immediate judicial relief.
3. The Ninth Circuit's Misapplication of the Prudential Ripeness Factors
Commentators have criticized the ripeness doctrine on a number of
fronts; for example, some argue that federal courts simply use ripeness to
duck controversial issues,2° while others point out that ripeness is a slip-
pery doctrine that gives courts justification for their timeliness determina-
tions.2 1 The Ninth Circuit's application of the ripeness principles in Adair
IV seems to lend credence to these arguments. Claims for treaty water rights
in the Klamath add fuel to a fire already hot because of over-appropriated
water resources and endangered species concerns. Under these difficult
circumstances, the possibility that a court would seize a doctrine that allows
it to avoid considering controversial issues is hardly surprising. In Adair IV,
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. See supra nn. 107-114 (Discussing the Colorado River abstention doctrine).
209. Comment, David Floren, Pre-Enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of Hardship, 80 Or.
L. Rev. 1107, 1130 (2001).
210. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 2.6.1 at 95 (1997).
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the Ninth Circuit called on the ripeness doctrine as an expedient justifica-
tion for its determination that the case should not be heard, a conclusion
more likely influenced by the unique nature of the McCarran Amendment
and the state-federal court tensions than anything else.2 '
a. Fitness of the Issue for Review
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the United States' and tribal claims
were not fit for review because the quantification standard was not a final
agency action.212 This conclusion is troublesome for a number of reasons.
First, courts generally employ the ripeness doctrine to protect administra-
tive agencies from judicial interference in agency decision-making that
usually involves the interpretation and application of statutes and regula-
213tions. The doctrine keeps the courts out of the process until a final deci-
sion is made; otherwise, courts could be asked to consider agency actions
on an almost daily basis. Thus, one purpose of ripeness is to reduce burdens
on federal courts.
But the United States and the Klamath tribes were not challenging an
administrative decision based on statutory or regulatory interpretation;
rather, they challenged the Water Department's interpretation of a federal
court order. The United States and tribal claims in Adair III were a rela-
tively unique form of action, involving the invocation of the district court's
retained jurisdiction over issues relating to "construction, effectuation,
modification or enforcement" of the quantification standard announced in
Adair 1.24 The United States and the tribes needed the district court to in-
terpret Judge Solomon's ruling because the state's interpretation seemed to
run counter to the holdings announced in Adair I and H, 215 as well as the
spirit of Winans. 216 The relief the tribes and the United States sought hardly
warranted the use of a doctrine designed to prevent courts from interfering
in the everyday functioning of administrative agencies because this type of
action would rarely arise again. In fact, this scenario could only arise in
cases where a previous federal court, foreseeing potential future problems,
211. See infra Part V, § B, arguing that the Colorado River abstention doctrine was lurking behind
the court's decision, and that had the court applied the doctrine, it would have counseled in favor of
federal court determination of the issue.
212. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 975.
213. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) ("Abbott Laboratories").
214. Seesupran. 15.
215. Judge Solomon and the Ninth Circuit concluded that the treaty reserved enough water to the
tribes to effectuate the purpose of allowing the tribes to continue their traditional hunting and fishing
lifestyle in order to provide their members with a moderate living. See supra Part I, §§ B-C. The state's
interpretation virtually eliminates any hope for continuing the tribes' hunting and fishing lifestyle be-
cause the level of fish harvested in 1979 was very low. See infra nn. 227-228 and accompanying text.
216. See 198 U.S. 371 (holding first, that treaty reserved rights are not grants to tribes, but rather,
grants from them, with everything not granted away reserved to tribes; and second, that the canons of
construction require that treaties between the federal government and the tribes should be interpreted as
the tribes would have understood them).
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retained jurisdiction over the case in order to see that the judgment is prop-
erly carried out.
That the final agency action requirement is largely derived from the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act217 is important to note because the tribes' and
the United States did not bring this action under the APA. Instead, the
United States originally filed the claim under the jurisdiction of section
1345 of Title 28 of the United States Code, concerning suits brought by the
United States. Thus, there was no need to insulate the federal agencies from
outside pressure until there is a final action, as the APA instructs courts to
do, because the federal government brought the suit.218 So the Ninth Circuit
essentially used ripeness, a doctrine related to a statute not at issue, to pro-
tect a state agency interpretation of a federal court order. Consequently, the
need for the protection afforded from the ripeness doctrine was tenuous at
best.
Second, when a federal court prematurely reviews an agency action, it in-
terferes with agency decision-making. As a result, the court could breach
the constitutionally created wall between the executive and judicial
branches, created by the separation of powers.219 Thus, courts use the ripe-
ness doctrine as a matter of prudence: to avoid entangling themselves in
abstract disputes and to protect agency decision-making from potentially
unconstitutional interference. However, no such constitutional concerns
were present in Adair IV because the Water Department did not make a
decision or formulate policy; rather, it merely attempted to interpret the
standard announced by the federal courts in Adair I and I. The posture of
Adair IV is more analogous to Congress amending a statute that an agency
is incorrectly interpreting, than a district court improperly interfering in
agency decision-making. This is because the district court, in Adair I, al-
ready proclaimed the law with respect to the standard to be used in quanti-
fying the tribes' water rights, and the Water Department appeared to misin-
terpret that standard. Just as Congress can amend a statute to correct an
agency misinterpretation of what the law was meant to be without violating
separation of powers, the Ninth Circuit should have allowed the district
court to correct the Water Department's misunderstanding of the law. Be-
cause the prudential concerns over separation of powers did not exist in
Adair III, there was no need for the final agency action requirement to pro-
tect the decision-making process.22°
217. 5 U.S.C. § 704 ("APA"). See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148-49.
218. There is no need to protect the federal government from itself.
219. See also R. George Wright, The Timing of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: The
Use and Abuse of Overlapping Doctrines, 11 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 83, 96-7 (1987).
220. See Winter v. California Medical Review, Inc., 900 F.2d at 1325 (stating that finality insures
that judicial review will not interfere with the agency's decision-making process). Agency decision-
making requires a delicate balancing of competing interests and a resolution that the agency believes
best serves all the interests and advances its goals. Ripeness protects the separation of powers by keep-
ing the courts from interfering in this balancing process. However, there was no need for this protection
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Third, finality and ripeness do not apply in Adair III and IV because the
action was brought under the continuing jurisdiction of the Adair I court. In
Adair I, the United States and the Klamath tribe sought a declaratory judg-
ment of their water rights. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, further
necessary or proper relief, based on a declaratory judgment, may be
granted.22' A court may grant such additional relief long after the original
declaratory judgment has been entered.222 Judge Solomon seized on this
facet of the declaratory judgment procedure by retaining jurisdiction in or-
der to construe, effectuate, and enforce compliance with the judgment.223
Because Judge Panner was enforcing compliance with the earlier judgment
under the court's retained jurisdiction, there was no need for an additional
ripeness inquiry. Requiring the United States and the Klamath Tribe to rees-
tablish the ripeness of their claims, and presumably the other prima facie
elements of jurisdiction, effectively eviscerates the retained jurisdiction of
the Adair I court by essentially requiring a new trial on the quantification
standard to be used in the adjudication. It is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit
panel that affirmed Judge Solomon's retained jurisdiction in 1983 would
224have anticipated such an outcome.
Further, in 1999, in U.S. v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the reasons for providing continuing federal court jurisdiction
are not the same as prerequisites for original jurisdiction.225 Thus, while
ripeness is a precondition for original jurisdiction, continuing jurisdiction
presupposes that ripeness has already been established, and the role of the
federal court is simply to "interpret and apply its own judgment to the fu-
ture conduct contemplated by the judgment., 2 6 In Adair III, Judge Panner
merely interpreted and applied the earlier judgments of the Adair I and 1I
courts to the conduct contemplated by the judgment: the state's water rights
adjudication. Therefore, the ripeness and finality doctrines should not apply
in Adair IV because the agency was not engaged in the normal decision-making process, e.g., one result-
ing in a formal rule or policy, as it was merely interpreting a federal court order.
221. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (stating that such relief may be granted "after reasonable notice and hear-
ing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment").
222. Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practices and Procedures: Civil, 3d § 2771 (1998).
223. See Adair 11, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1274 (quoting paragraph 15 of Judge Solomon's declaratory
Judgment).
224. See Adair I!, 723 F.2d at 1419-20.
225. 174 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Alpine Land"). The issue in Alpine Land was whether
the state or federal court had jurisdiction over actions arising out of the federal court issued Alpine and
Orr Ditch Decrees. These decrees attempted to settle the water rights of the Carson and Truckee River
Basins, and provided that applications to change the place or manner of use should be directed in the
first instance to the Nevada State Engineer. In the case, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service filed
applications with the State Engineer to change the place and manner of use, and Churchill County ap-
pealed the Engineer's approval to the state court. The Engineer subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction in federal district court because the Ninth Circuit had earlier held that appeals
from the decisions of the State Engineer arising out of the Orr and Alpine Decrees go to the district
court. Id. After losing in the district court, the county appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that the
district court retained exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising out of the decrees. Id.
226. Id.
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because Judge Panner properly limited his jurisdiction to interpreting and
clarifying the earlier judgment under the district court's retained jurisdic-
227tion.
In Alpine Land, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that when a district
court retains jurisdiction over an action, the jurisdiction should almost al-
ways be interpreted as exclusive.228 This is because having "state courts
construing what the federal court meant in the judgment... would potentially
frustrate the federal district court's purpose., 229 Further, the court deter-
mined that because the case involved interpreting court decrees concerning
complex water adjudications, "conflicting federal and state constructions
would be entirely unworkable, [thus] the district court's retention of juris-
diction was intended to be exclusive., 230 Based on this principle, the Ore-
gon District Court should have exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation
and construction of the quantification standard announced in Adair I and 11.
This conclusion follows directly from the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Al-
pine Land,231 because Adair I involved a complex water adjudication,
where conflicting state and federal constructions would be unworkable, and
thus exclusive jurisdiction should be inferred. Therefore, the district court
should not have been required to wait for final state agency action because
under Alpine Land, only the district court has the authority to interpret and
construe the quantification standard announced in Adair I and II.
While the United States and tribes' argued that the Adair I and II courts
already had determined that the case was ripe, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
dismissed the argument by stating that the issue in Adair I and H was
"whether the Tribes had any right to water., 232 In Adair IV, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Adair III dispute related solely to the adjudication,
holding that because Adair I was predicated on different legal and factual
grounds than Adair III, the previous courts' ripeness determinations had no
effect on the Adair III claim.233 However, this is a mischaracterization of
the Adair I and I holdings because in Adair II, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's declaration of "the proper method for measuring the re-
served water rights originally attached to the reservation. The Ninth
Circuit thus announced that the scope of the Adair I decision extended to
the quantification standard the Water Department should use in the adjudi-
cation, a scope which goes well beyond "whether the tribes had any right to
water," as the Adair IV court claimed. Allowing the Water Department to
construe the standard announced in Adair I and II without review by the
227. Adair lll, 187 F. Supp.2d at 1275.
228. Alpine Land, 174 F.3dat 1013.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 976.
233. Id.
234. Adair 11, 723 F.2d at 1399, 1420 (emphasis added).
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district court, under its retained jurisdiction, essentially made the retention
of that jurisdiction a nullity. The Ninth Circuit has previously held
that nullification of retained jurisdiction is inappropriate. 35
Lastly, the other factors generally used determine if an issue is fit for re-
view-whether the issue is primarily legal and whether it requires further
factual development-counseled in favor of judicial consideration of the
Adair III claim. 236 In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court held that an
issue was purely legal because it concerned whether a statute was properly
construed by an agency.237 Similarly, the issue in Adair III was purely legal
because the United States and the tribes sought an interpretation of the
quantification standard announced in Adair I and I1. The standard an-
nounced in Adair II, that the Klamath Tribes are entitled to as much water
as they need to protect their hunting and fishing rights to ensure the moder-
ate livelihood of tribal members,238 is unhelpfully vague. In Adair III, Judge
Panner clarified this standard by concluding that the moderate livelihood of
tribal members can be protected only if there is enough water to support a
productive fishery.239 No facts were at issue in Judge Panner's clarification
because he made his decision based on the requirements of federal law.24
Additionally, no further factual development was necessary because the
issue in Adair III was how to interpret the legal standard laid down in Adair
I and I: that the tribes are entitled to as much water as necessary to fulfill
their hunting, fishing and gathering rights to supply a moderate living to the
tribal members. Because the need for a final agency action was slight, as
the agency was merely construing a federal court order, not interpreting a
statute under delegated authority, and the issue was primarily legal with no
need for further factual development, the Ninth Circuit should have con-
cluded that the case was fit for review.
b. Hardship to the Parties of Withholding Review
Hardship to the parties exists where the effect of postponing review is
immediate, direct, significant, and involves more than the possibility of
financial lOSS. 24 1 The Ninth Circuit held that there would be no hardship to
235. See Alpine Land, 174 F.3d at 1013 (stating further that "it would make no sense for the district
court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judgment to the future conduct contemplated by
the judgment, yet have a state court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment. Such an
arrangement would potentially frustrate the federal district court's purpose").
236. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 975.
237. 387 U.S. at 149.
238. See Adair ll, 723 F.2d at 1414-15.
239. See Adair III.
240. Id. (stating that if the water right was quantified at a level that would not support a productive
habitat, the tribes' treaty right would be abrogated, which only Congress has the power to do). That no
facts were at issue makes Adair III similar to Phase H of United States v. Washington, where the Ninth
Circuit also vacated a district court opinion supporting a tribal treaty right of habitat protection. See
supra n. 84.
241. Municipality of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the parties in waiting for additional factual development.242 However, this
conclusion overlooked the significant hardship to all the parties that result
from postponing judicial review of the quantification standard announced
by Judge Solomon in Adair L There are at least four hardships that befall
the parties to the Adair III litigation.
First, all parties stand to lose a significant amount of money litigating the
standard through the contested case hearings, in the state courts, and per-
haps ultimately in the United States Supreme Court. While a significant loss
243of money is not enough to qualify as hardship alone, it is an important
consideration in this time of state budget shortfalls and a slow economy.
244
Second, the tribes stand to effectively lose their water rights in the con-
tested case hearings. The Water Department's preliminary standard inter-
preted the Adair I and II standard guaranteeing the tribes only "the mini-
mum quantity of water necessary to protect treaty hunting and fishing re-
sources as they existed in 1979.,,245 Because the level of fish harvested in
1979 was very low, the level of water needed to protect those harvest levels
would be very small.246 This outcome also serves to eviscerate the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Adair II, which stated that the tribes have a water right
to enough water to supply tribal members with a moderate living. 47
Third, the tribes unenforceable water right will continue for an even
longer period of time, as the Oregon will not allow senior rights holders,
like the Klamath Tribes, to bring claims against junior users until the adju-
dication is finalized.2 " Because a district court has already held the Water
Department's standard to be flawed, the continued use of the standard to
quantify the tribes' right in the adjudication will require the tribes to litigate
the standard through the Oregon courts and United States Supreme Court,
which could take many more years. Therefore, the injury to the tribes' cul-
tural and religious lifestyles resulting from a lack of fish to harvest may
continue indefinitely, as well as the accompanying loss of food, income,
and economic opportunities.249
Finally, there would be very little hardship to the state and to the defen-
dants by having a federal court exercise its expertise in interpreting federal
242. See Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 976. See also supra nn. 181-183 and accompanying text.
243. Municipality of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d at 1325-26.
244. See, e.g., Revenue Blues Expected to Continue, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), May 14, 2003,
at A1 (reporting that with the Oregon economy still stalled, state budget shortfalls are likely to continue).
245. Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 976.
246. See Kandra, 145 F. Supp.2d at 1197, 1201 (stating that "the Klamath and Yurok Tribes rely on
the fish as a vital component of the Tribes' cultures, traditions, and economic vitality," and that "many
customs and traditions revolve around the fish harvest, which is now reduced, or in the case of the
suckers, non-existent"). See also Reed Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath
Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 197,202, 237 (2002).
247. Adair I, 723 F.2d at 1414-15.
248. See Reed Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the
Pacific Northwest, Despites the Rule of Prior Appropriation, 28 Envtl. L. 881, 901-902 (1998).
249. See Kandra, 145 F. Supp.2d at 1201 (describing the importance of the fish to the Klamath
Tribe, and the hardship suffered by Tribal members as a result of the decline of the fisheries).
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law by clarifying the correct quantification standard. A clear standard
would streamline the adjudication and perhaps require less litigation in the
administrative hearings and in the courts. Further, a clear standard provides
certainty and finality to all the parties, a central benefit of water rights adju-
dication.50 Providing a streamlined adjudication, certainty, and finality
would save all the parties time and money. Because judicial review of the
standard now would eliminate these hardships, the Ninth Circuit should
have held the case ripe for review.
B. Unseen Effects of the McCarran Amendment and Colorado River
Abstention
The ripeness holding effectively ended the case for the Oregon District
Court and the Ninth Circuit. Despite the Ninth Circuit's Adair IV holding,
which did not reach the state's challenge to the district court's exercise of
jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment,25' Colorado River abstention
likely influenced the court enough to hold the case not ripe for review in
order to avoid the merits reached in the Adair III decision.252 Had the court
examined the Colorado River doctrine's policy of furthering "wise judicial
administration" through "conservation of judicial resources and compre-
hensive disposition of litigation, 253 however, the Adair IV panel would
likely have sided with the Adair II panel in finding that the district court
properly exercised its jurisdiction. By vacating the judgment and staying
the case until the adjudication and the subsequent judicial review are com-
plete, the Ninth Circuit did a disservice to the policy and purposes underly-
ing the Colorado River doctrine. In Adair II, the court held that were it to
erase the district court's careful consideration of the federal water rights
questions presented by the suit, the appellate court would effectively cause
precisely the duplication and waste of judicial effort that Colorado River
was designed to avoid.254 Yet, the Adair IV court caused the precise results
that the Adair 1I panel sought to avoid by necessitating relitigation of the
quantification standard in administrative hearings, state courts, and perhaps
the United States Supreme Court.
250. See Benson, supra n. 254.
251. See Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 976.
252. See supra nn. 107-114 for a discussion of Colorado River abstention. The fact that the United
States and the Klamath tribe brought the case under the retained limited jurisdiction of the district court
from Adair 1, signals that ripeness should not apply to determine the jurisdiction of the district court in
Adair III; not to mention that the ripeness elements arguably counsel in favor of judicial review. Be-
cause of this, I argue that the Ninth Circuit sought to avoid the merits of the Adair III decision due to the
Colorado River doctrine, which encourages state adjudication of water rights. Thus, the court may have
used ripeness as a means to avoid the adjudication of the merits of the case.
253. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
254. Adair 1I, 723 F.2d at 1404 (stating that if the court vacated the district court decision, "thereby
necessitating relitigation of the same issues in state court, we would in effect, 'throw the baby out with
the bath' and create precisely the duplication and waste of judicial effort that Colorado River abstention
and the McCarran Amendment are designed to avoid").
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In Colorado River, the Supreme Court concluded that the avoidance of
piecemeal litigation was important because such additional litigation would
result in "inconsistent dispositions of property., 255 By allowing the Water
Department to rely on a faulty quantification standard, the Adair IV deci-
sion created the possibility of inconsistent disposition of water rights, a
highly important property right in the west. While there is no "disposition"
until the adjudication is finalized, correcting the Water Department's erro-
neous quantification standard before it is applied increases the certainty of
property rights. Due to the "highly interdependent" nature of water
rights,256 if the standard used to quantify the tribal water rights is later held
incorrect, a significant number of the adjudication's water rights determina-
tions will also be incorrect, thereby creating inconsistency. This would ne-
cessitate reassessment of all the effected rights in another expensive and
lengthy adjudication procedure. Therefore, upholding the district court's
clarification of the standard, announced in Adair I and II, would have fur-
thered the purposes and policies of the Colorado River doctrine by avoiding
conflicting "dispositions of property. 257
Concurrent federal proceedings in the Klamath adjudication would not
create duplicative and wasteful litigation, offensive to the Colorado River
abstention. 258 As explained by the Adair I court, allowing the federal court
to announce the standard, and the state to apply and administer it, allows
"each forum to consider those issues most appropriate to its expertise. '259
The Adair III ruling promoted a streamlined adjudication because the
United States and the Klamath tribes would not have to challenge the quan-
tification standard in the 892 contests involving the tribes' asserted
rights.260 The United States and the Klamath tribes also would not have to
challenge the standard in the Oregon courts and potentially the Supreme
Court, thereby cutting down on litigation and giving finality to the rights
announced in the adjudication. Because Judge Panner carefully limited his
jurisdiction to the clarification of the quantification standard already an-
nounced, the Ninth Circuit in Adair IV should have upheld the decision as
promoting the policy of wise judicial administration that the McCarran
Amendment was designed to promote, as the Adair II court did with Judge
Solomon's decision in Adair I.
255. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 567.
259. Adair IH, 723 F.2d 1406.
260. See Adair IV, 338 F.3d at 974 (stating that the United States filed four hundred and eighty
contests, the Klamath tribes filed two hundred and forty two, while individuals filed one hundred and
thirty four contests against the claims made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and 36 against the tribes'
claims).
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CONCLUSION
Since 1905, when Justice McKenna announced that the Indian tribes re-
served rights to themselves in the treaty negotiations, the federal courts
have slowly honored the promises made by the United States in the treaty
documents. Judge Panner's Adair III opinion was a link in the chain of
court decisions beginning to recognize the right to habitat protection im-
plied in the treaties between the United States and the tribes.261 However,
Indian tribes seeking to assert this right now face an uphill battle. The Ninth
Circuit's avoidance of the issue in Adair IV, based on the Water Depart-
ment's interpretation of the federal quantification standard not being ripe
for review, despite an express retention of jurisdiction to interpret and apply
the standard by the district court in Adair I, should be glaring evidence of
the hurdles that tribes continue to face in enforcing their treaty rights.
Despite this result, the quantification standard announced in Adair III
may serve as persuasive precedent for courts considering tribal water rights
involving reserved hunting and fishing rights because of its fundamental
understanding of the need for water to fulfill the purposes of the former
Klamath reservation.262 Judge Panner properly interpreted and applied the
canons of construction-which direct that Indian treaties be construed in
favor of the tribes-as well as previous Supreme Court precedent, 263 in
concluding that the treaties create an implied right to habitat protection.
Without productive habitat to support fish to catch, the right to take fish,
264
which the Supreme Court characterized as a property right in Winans,
may become worthless.
265
By vacating Judge Panner's decision, the Ninth Circuit guaranteed that
the water rights at issue in the Klamath region will not be settled for many
more years. While some appropriators benefit from maintaining the status
quo as long as possible, their gain comes at the expense of economic effi-
ciency, which calls for certain and settled rights that are far from being ob-
tained. In order for the contentious water issues in the Klamath Basin to be
resolved,266 the adjudication must be completed as soon as possible. Judge
261. See Blumm and Swift, supra n. 6, at 462-480.
262. Because Judge Panner's decision was vacated on procedural grounds, the substantive merits of
his decision--that reserved fishing rights entitle tribes to enough water to support a productive fishery-
have not been overruled.
263. The Supreme Court has stated that the treaty negotiators understood the importance of fishing
to the tribe's way of life, and that it would be "inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to
authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of the accustomed places to
fish." Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686.
264. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
265. A result that the Supreme Court concluded should not occur. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576
(holding that the canons of construction mandate that courts imply reserved water rights to effectuate the
purposes of the reservation because otherwise the tribes granted away valuable expanses of land to settle
on unproductive and worthless land, an inequitable and unconscionable result).
266. For a discussion of the contentious nature of the issues, see generally Doremus and Tarlock,
supra n. 38.
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Panner's decision would have streamlined the process and brought resolu-
tion a few steps closer. Instead, the Klamath Basin adjudication continues
into the end of its third decade with no end in sight.

